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A combination of a fall in housing wealth from declining house prices
and a fall in real income from increasing energy and food prices made
individualsworseoff. Althoughamoderaterecessionbeganattheendof2007,
it intensiﬁed in the summer of 2008. Based on the view that dysfunction
in credit markets intensiﬁed the recession, monetary policy has focused on
intervention into individual credit markets deemed impaired.
Thealternativeexplanationofferedherefortheintensiﬁcationofthereces-
sionemphasizespropagationoftheoriginalrealshocksthroughcontractionary
monetary policy. The intensiﬁcation of the recession followed the pattern of
recessions in the stop-go period of the late 1960s and 1970s, in which the Fed
introduced cyclical inertia in the funds relative to changes in economic activ-
ity. For example, in late 1973 and early 1974, an inﬂation shock because of an
oil-price rise and the end of price controls reduced real income. The recession
thatbeganinNovember1973intensiﬁedinthelatefallof1974. Inthesummer
of 1974, the Fed backed away from its procedures calling for reductions in
the funds rate in response to deteriorating economic activity (Hetzel 2008a,
Ch. 10). However, with a funds rate that peaked in July 1974 at 13 percent,
the Fed eventually had ample room to lower signiﬁcantly the nominal and real
funds rate. What is unusual about the current period is the zero-lower-bound
(ZLB) constraint that arises with a zero-funds rate.
The argument advanced here is that in the summer of 2008 the Federal
Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) departure from its standard procedures
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calling for reductions in the funds rate in response to deteriorating economic
activityproducedamonetaryshockthatexacerbatedtherecession. Suchanar-
gument involves a “what if?” counterfactual about policy. The complexity of
forces affecting economic activity renders the validity of policy counterfactu-
als for individual episodes uncertain. Nevertheless, the explanation advanced
here for the intensiﬁcation of the recession falls into a longer-run pattern of
recessions. The spirit of this article is to use empirical generalizations de-
duced from historical experience and constrained by theory so that they are
robust for predicting the consequences of monetary policy. The two con-
tenders matched here are the credit-cycle view and the quantity-theory view
ofcyclicalﬂuctuations. Thecredit-cycleviewexplainscyclicalmovementsin
output as a consequence of speculative booms leading to unsustainable levels
of asset prices and leveraged levels of asset holdings followed by credit busts
that depress economic activity through the impairment caused to the func-
tioning of ﬁnancial intermediation from insolvencies and deleveraging. The
quantity-theory view explains signiﬁcant cyclical movements in output as a
consequence of monetary disorder deriving from the introduction by central
banks of inertia in adjustment of the interest rate to shocks.
Section1summarizesthesetwoalternativeframeworksforunderstanding
cyclical ﬂuctuations. Section 2 provides an intuitive overview of the quantity-
theory framework. Section 3 provides an empirical characterization of the
evolution of monetary policy, which relates that evolution to the degree of
cyclical instability in the economy. Using this empirical generalization, Sec-
tion 4 argues that monetary policy became contractionary in the summer of
2008. Section5makesnormativerecommendationsformonetarypolicyfaced
with the ZLB constraint and argues for the creation of institutional arrange-
mentsthatreplacediscretionwithrules. Section6arguesthat,foraproductive
debate on institutional arrangements to occur between academic economists
and policymakers, the latter will have to use the language of economics. An
appendix, “LessonsfromtheDepression,” usestheDepressionasalaboratory
for distinguishing between the efﬁcacy of credit-channel and money-creation
policies.
1. WHAT IS THE RIGHT FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING
ABOUT MONETARY POLICY?
Verybroadly, Iplaceexplanationsofcyclicalﬂuctuationsineconomicactivity
into two categories. The ﬁrst category comprises explanations in which real
forces overwhelm the working of the price system. According to the credit
cycle, or “psychological factors,” explanation of the business cycle, waves of
optimism arise and then inevitably give way to waves of pessimism. These
swings in the psychology of investors overwhelm the stabilizing behavior of
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“low”interestratesfailtooffsetthedepressingeffectsoftheliquidationofbad
debt. Inthereal-billsvariant,centralbanksinitiatethephasedrivenbyinvestor
optimism through “cheap” credit (Hetzel 2008a, 12–3 and 34). Speculation
in the boom phase drives both asset prices and leveraging through debt to
unsustainable levels. The inevitable correction requires a period of deﬂation
andrecessiontoeliminatethepriorspeculativeexcesses. Atpresent, thisview
appears in the belief that Wall Street bankers driven by greed took excessive
risks and, in reaction, became excessively risk-averse (Hetzel 2009b).
Withinthistradition,Keynesianismemergedinresponsetothepessimistic
implication of real bills about the necessity of recession and deﬂation as fore-
ordained because of the required liquidation of the excessive debts incurred
in the boom period. As with psychological-factors explanations of the busi-
ness cycle, investor “animal spirits” drove the cycle. The failure of the price
system to allocate resources efﬁciently, either across markets or over time,
produced an underemployment equilibrium in which, in response to shocks,
real output adjusted, not prices. In a way given by the multiplier, real output
would adjust to the variations in investment driven by animal spirits. The
Keynesian model rationalized the policy prescription that, in recession, gov-
ernment deﬁcit spending (ampliﬁed by the multiplier) should make up for the
difference between the full employment and actual spending of the public.
Monetary policy became impotent because banks and the public would sim-
ply hold on to the money balances created from central bank open market
purchases (a liquidity trap).
Another variant of the view that periodically powerful real forces over-
whelm the stabilizing properties of the price system is that imbalances create
overproductioninparticularsectorsbecauseofentrepreneurialmiscalculation.
When these mistakes reinforce each other, an inventory correction inevitably
occurs. Recession lasts until the correction of the prior imbalances has oc-
curred. Monetary policy possesses only limited ability to offset the resulting
swings in output.
Atpresent,thereal-billsvariantofthepsychological-factorsviewofcycli-
cal instability explains the focus of monetary policy on subsidizing interme-
diation in ﬁnancial markets judged dysfunctional. According to this view,
ﬁnancial market dysfunction because of prior speculative excess manifests
itself in the apparent failure of investors to arbitrage disparate returns across
markets and the apparent failure of banks to arbitrage the marginal cost of
borrowing and the marginal return to lending. Contrary to the pessimistic
real-bills view that a period of recession and deﬂation must inevitably accom-
pany correction of the prior excesses of a speculative bubble and analogous
to the Keynesian critique of real bills, the assumption of policymakers is that
government can shorten the adjustment period by taking losses off the private
balance sheets of banks, for example, by recapitalizing banks. Also, central204 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
bankscandirectlyreplacetheintermediationformerlyprovidedbytheprivate
market.
Accordingly, after the FOMC’s reduction of the funds rate to near zero in
December 2008, many policymakers began to characterize monetary policy
in terms of ﬁnancial intermediation, that is, in terms of the Fed’s purchases
of debt in particular credit markets and how those purchases affect the cost of
credit. The premise for this credit-channel view of the transmission of mon-
etary policy is the existence of frictions in ﬁnancial markets accompanied by
negativeexternalities,whichthecentralbankcanmitigatebytakingriskydebt
intoitsownportfolio. Atthesametime, inthespiritoftheKeynesianliquidity
trap, with a near-zero-funds rate, the resulting behavior of the monetary base
(currency held by the public and commercial bank deposits at the Fed) pos-
sesses no implications for aggregate demand because banks and the public are
operating on a ﬂat section of their demand schedules where the monetary base
and the debt acquired through open market operations are perfect substitutes.
In the second class of explanations of cyclical ﬂuctuations, the price sys-
temgenerallyworkswelltomaintainoutputatitsfullemploymentlevel. Inthe
real-business-cycle tradition, the price system works well without exception.
In the quantity-theory tradition, it does so apart from episodes of monetary
disorder that prevent the price system from offsetting cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Milton Friedman (1960, 9) exposited the latter tradition:
The Great Depression did much to instill and reinforce the now widely
held view that inherent instability of a private market economy has been
responsible for the major periods of economic distress experienced by
the United States....As I read the historical record, I draw almost the
opposite conclusion. In almost every instance, major instability in the
United States has been produced or, at the very least, greatly intensiﬁed
by monetary instability.
An implication of the quantity-theory view that the price system works
efﬁciently to allocate resources is that investors arbitrage risk-adjusted yield
differences among ﬁnancial markets. While the frictions that operate in ﬁnan-
cialmarketsmaybecomeagreaterimpedimenttointermediationinrecession,
these frictions derive from the general environment of economic uncertainty.
There is little the central bank can do with credit market interventions apart
from rearranging risk premia among different markets. In December 2008,
the relevant friction was with the existence of money that created a ZLB con-
straint on the level of the interest rate. Even with a zero-funds rate, given the
expectation of low inﬂation, the real interest rate, which becomes the negative
of expected inﬂation, may be too high to offset the pessimism of individuals
about their future income prospects. Nevertheless, through the creation of
reserves resulting from the aggressive purchase of illiquid assets, the central
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demand schedules and stimulate asset acquisition and expenditure through
portfolio rebalancing by the public.1
Attribution of a particular recession to one of these two broad categories
is inevitably problematic because of the large number of special factors at
work. The claim made here is that the current recession adds one observation
favorabletothequantity-theoryormonetary-shockexplanationofthebusiness
cycle. Whether readers ﬁnd that explanation convincing will depend upon
whether they interpret the long-run historical record as supporting this view.
The debate is perennial and appears in interpretation of the monetary
transmission process going from central bank actions to the spending of the
public. Should one understand it from the perspective of the ability of the
central bank to inﬂuence conditions in credit markets or from the perspective
of central bank control over money creation? John Maynard Keynes ([1930]
1971, 191) highlighted the two views:
A banker...is acting both as provider of money for his depositors,
and also as a provider of resources for his borrowing-customers. Thus
the modern banker performs two distinct sets of services. He supplies a
substitute for State Money by acting as a clearing-house and transferring
current payments....But he is also acting as a middleman in respect of
a particular type of lending, receiving deposits from the public which he
employs in purchasing securities, or in making loans....This duality of
function is the clue to many difﬁculties in the modern Theory of Money
and Credit and the source of some serious confusions of thought.
2. A HEURISTIC DISCUSSION OFA QUANTITY THEORY
FRAMEWORK
The quantity theory guides the formulation of empirical generalizations de-
duced from historical experience and constrained by theory so that they are
robust for predicting the consequences of monetary policy. The heart of the
quantitytheoryisthenominal/realdistinctionthatderivesfromtheassumption
that individual welfare depends only upon real variables (physical quantities
and relative prices). It follows that in a world with ﬁat money central banks
1 Friedman ([1961] 1969, 255) explains the portfolio rebalancing that occurs when the cen-
tral bank undertakes open-market purchases and how that rebalancing stimulates expenditure: “The
[public’s] new balance sheet [after an open-market purchase] is in one sense still in equilib-
rium...since the open-market transaction was voluntary....An asset was sold for money because
the terms were favorable; however...[f]rom a longer-term view, the new balance sheet is out of
equilibrium, with cash being temporarily high relative to other assets. Holders of cash will seek to
purchase assets....The key feature of this process is that it tends to raise the prices of sources of
both producer and consumer services relative to the prices of the services themselves: for example,
to raise the prices of houses relative to the rents of dwelling units, or the cost of purchasing a
car relative to the cost of renting one. It therefore encourages the production of such sources (this
is the stimulus to ‘investment’...) and, at the same time, the direct acquisition of services rather
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have to give nominal (dollar-denominated) variables well-deﬁned values. Be-
yondthisfundamentalimplication,Friedmanusedthenominal/realdistinction
to give the quantity theory empirical content through two empirical general-
izations. First, Friedman ([1963] 1968, 39) argued that inﬂation is “always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Speciﬁcally, the rate of inﬂa-
tion depends positively upon the rate of money growth. Second, Friedman
([1963] 1968, 34–5; [1968] 1969) argued that, while unexpected inﬂation can
stimulate output, expected inﬂation cannot. That is, the central bank cannot
exercise systematic or predictable control over real variables (the natural-rate
hypothesis). Nevertheless, monetary instability, which Friedman measured
using ﬂuctuations in the money stock relative to steady growth, destabilizes
real output.
These empirical generalizations require reformulation for the world of
unstable money demand that prevailed in the United States after 1980 (Hetzel
2004, 2005, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). The ﬁrst generalization appears in the
assumption that central banks determine trend inﬂation through their (explicit
or implicit) inﬂation targets. The “monetary” character of inﬂation, which
entailsdenialofexogenouslygivenpowerfulcost-pushforcesthatraiseprices,
implies that central banks can achieve their target for trend inﬂation without
periodicrecourseto“high”unemployment. Thesecondgeneralizationappears
intheassumptionthatmonetarystabilityrequiresthatthecentralbankpossess
consistent procedures (a rule) that both allow the price system to work and
that provide a nominal anchor (give the price level a well-deﬁned value). As
explained in Section 3, I characterize these procedures as “lean against the
wind with credibility.” Furthermore, I argue that the Fed departed from this
rule in the summer of 2008 by failing to lower the funds rate in response to
sustained weakness in economic activity.
An essential quantity-theory assumption is that central banks are special
because of their monopoly over creation of the monetary base—the money
used to effect ﬁnality of payment among banks (deposits with the Fed) or
among individuals (currency). A central bank is not simply a large commer-
cial bank engaged in intermediating funds between savers and investors. It
followsthatthecentralbankcontrolsthebehaviorofpricesthroughprocedures
that provide for monetary control. For a central bank using the short-term in-
terest rate (the funds rate) as its policy variable, monetary control imposes
a discipline that derives from the role played by the real interest rate in the
price system. This discipline takes the form of procedures that must respect
Friedman’s natural-rate hypothesis, that is, the assumption that the central
bank cannot systematically control real variables, like the real interest rate.
The implication is that monetary policy procedures must stabilize expected
inﬂation so that changes in the central bank’s nominal funds rate target cor-
respond to predictable changes in the real funds rate. These procedures must
then cause the real funds rate to track the “natural” interest rate. The naturalR. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 207
interest rate is the real interest rate consistent with an amount of aggregate de-
mand that provides for market clearing at full employment. The real interest
rate provides the incentive for individuals to change their contemporaneous
demand for resources (consumption and investment) relative to that demand
in the future in a way that smooths changes in output around trend.
Price theory yields useful intuition for the natural interest rate. Imagine
supply and demand schedules for the wheat market. There exists a well-
deﬁned dollar price for wheat that clears the market. Similarly, there exists
such a dollar price for barley. The ratio of these dollar prices yields a relative
(real) price (the barley price of wheat) that clears the market for wheat. If the
government uses a commodity-price stabilization program to ﬁx the price of
wheat, it will either need to accumulate wheat or to supply it depending upon
whether it ﬁxes a price above or below the market-clearing price.
For a central bank with an interest rate instrument, the relevant price is
the real rate of interest—the price of resources today measured in terms of
resources promised or foregone tomorrow. Note that this price is an intertem-
poral price whose determination requires analysis in a multiperiod model.
Furthermore, the central bank does not create wealth but creates the monetary
base, which derives value from its role as a temporary abode of purchasing
power. Although money facilitates exchange, it possesses no intrinsic value.
Individuals accept money today in return for goods, which satisfy real wants,
only because they believe that others will accept goods for money tomorrow.
Stability of prices requires the expectation of future stability. Just as with the
real interest rate, this intertemporal dimension to the price of money (or the
money price of goods—the price level) will also require a multiperiod model.
Itfollowsthatthepublic’sexpectationsaboutthefutureareessentialandthata
characterization of central bank policy must elucidate the systematic behavior
that shapes these expectations.
Analogously with the market in wheat, if the central bank sets an interest
rate that is too low, it will have to create money. Conversely, an interest rate
set too high will require destruction of money. An implication of the quantity
theory is that such money creation and destruction will require changes in the
price level to maintain the real purchasing power of money desired by the
public to effect transactions. The quantity theory receives content through the
natural-rateassumptionthatthereisauniquemarket-clearingrealinterestrate
that lies beyond the systematic control of the central bank. As a condition for
controlling prices, the central bank must possess systematic procedures for
tracking this natural interest rate.2
2Although the natural-rate hypothesis is associated with the names of Wicksell ([1898] 1962)
and Friedman ([1968] 1969), it possesses a long history (Humphrey 1983). The term “natural” goes
back to the Bullionist/anti-Bullionist debate of the early 19th century (Hetzel 1987). In the 1970s,
the issue was whether central banks faced a menu of unemployment rates associated inversely with
inﬂation. The combination of high inﬂation and high unemployment in the 1970s supported the208 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Theseproceduresrequireconsistency(arule-likecharacter)becauseofthe
central role of expectations. What is relevant for macroeconomic equilibrium
is not only the real funds rate but also the entire term structure of real interest
rates. The central bank requires a procedure for changing the funds rate so
that, in response to real shocks, ﬁnancial markets will forecast a behavior of
current and future funds rates consistent with a term structure of real interest
rates that will moderate ﬂuctuations of real output around trend. Moreover,
these procedures must be credible in that ﬁnancial markets must believe that,
in response to shocks, funds rate changes will cumulate to whatever extent
necessary to leave trend inﬂation unchanged (Hetzel 2006 and 2008b).
Credibility for these procedures allows the central bank to inﬂuence the
way that ﬁrms set dollar prices. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms will set their dollar prices
based on a common assumption about trend inﬂation (equal to the central
bank’s inﬂation target). Moreover, they do not alter that assumption in re-
sponse to real or inﬂation shocks. The combination of assumptions that the
price level is a monetary phenomenon (the central bank determines trend in-
ﬂation) and that expectations are rational (consistent with the predictable part
of central bank behavior) implies that the central bank can control the expec-
tational environment in which price setters operate. Given stability in this
nominal expectational environment, that is, given credibility, the central bank
can then set the real funds rate in a way that tracks the natural interest rate
and, as a result, allows the private sector to determine real variables such as
unemployment.
From the perspective of the quantity theory, the credit-cycle view of the
business cycle leads to the mistaken belief that alternating waves of optimism
and pessimism overwhelm the stabilizing role of the real interest rate and,
by extension, monetary policy. The reason is because of the association of
low interest rates (cheap money) with recession and high interest rates (dear
money)withbooms. Forexample, theBoardofGovernors(1943a, 10)stated:
In the past quarter century it has been demonstrated that policies
regulating the...cost of money cannot by themselves produce economic
stability or even exert a powerful inﬂuence in that direction. The coun-
try has gone through boom conditions when...interest rates were ex-
tremely high, and it has continued in depression at times when...money
was...cheap.
The mistake lies in thinking of monetary policy as stimulative when the
funds rate is low or as restrictive when it is high. Instead, the focus should
be on whether the central bank possesses consistent procedures (a rule) that
implication of the natural-rate hypothesis that central banks cannot systematically control the level
of real variables.R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 209
cause the real funds rate to track the natural rate. A low real interest can still
exceed the natural rate if the public is pessimistic enough about the future.
3. LAW WITH CREDIBILITY, MONETARY CONTROL,AND
MONETARY DISTURBANCES
An implication of the above formulation of the quantity theory is that there
exists a policy procedure (a central bank reaction function) that, when ad-
hered to, yields price and macroeconomic stability but that, when departed
from, creates instability. That is, a consistent procedure exists that allows




McChesney Martin (FOMC chairman from the time of the March 1951
Treasury-Fed Accord through January 1970). As encapsulated in Martin’s
characterization of policy as “lean against the wind” (LAW), the Fed lowers
thefundsrateinameasured, persistentwayinresponsetosustaineddecreases
in resource utilization rates (increases in unemployment) and conversely in
response to sustained increases in resource utilization rates (decreases in
unemployment). The Martin FOMC (prior to populist pressures from the
Lyndon B. Johnson administration) imposed discipline on the resulting funds
rate changes through the requirement that they be consistent with maintaining
the expectation of price stability read from the behavior of bond rates (LAW
with credibility).
DeparturesfromLAWwithcredibilitycorrelatewithperiodsofeconomic
instability. After the establishment of the Fed in 1913 and before the 1951
Treasury-FedAccord, within the Fed, real-bills views predominated. The fo-
cusofmonetarypolicywasonlimitingthedevelopmentofasset-pricebubbles.
The focus on asset prices instead of sustained changes in rates of resource
utilization was accompanied by a high degree of economic instability (see
Appendix). With LAW, Martin changed the focus of monetary policy from
speculation in asset markets to the cyclical behavior of the economy. Also, by
looking to bond markets for evidence of “speculative activity” rather than real
estate and equity markets, he changed the focus to inﬂationary expectations
and, as a result, credibility for price stability.
Fluctuations in economic activity diminished signiﬁcantly in the post-
Accord period. However, on occasion, the Martin FOMC departed from the
nascent LAW-with-credibility procedures. In the period before the August
1957 cyclical peak, the FOMC, concerned about inﬂation, kept short-term
interest rates unchanged despite deterioration in economic activity. Prior to
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outﬂows, kept short-term interest rates unchanged despite deterioration in the
economy. In each case, recession followed.
The period known as stop-go began in 1965 when the political system,
despite strong economic growth, pressured the Fed not to raise interest rates
and thwart its desire to stimulate the economy through the 1964 tax cuts.
FOMC chairmenArthur Burns (February 1970–March 1978) and G. William
Miller (April 1978–July 1979) retained LAW, but imparted cyclical inertia to
funds rate changes. After cyclical peaks, the funds rate remained elevated
while gross domestic product (GDP) growth declined and money growth fell.
After cyclical troughs, the funds rate remained low while GDP growth rose
and money growth increased (see Hetzel 2008a, Chs. 23–24). The result was
procyclical money growth. The view that powerful cost-push factors drove
inﬂation caused Burns and Miller to allow inﬂation to drift upward across
the business cycle (Hetzel 2008a, Chs. 1, 8, 11). As a consequence, they
destroyedthenominalanchortheyhadinheritedintheformoftheexpectation
thatinﬂationwouldﬂuctuatearoundalowlevelwithperiodsofrelativelyhigh
rates followed by periods of relatively low rates. Instead, the expectation of
trend inﬂation drifted with real and inﬂation shocks.
After stop-go monetary policy, FOMC chairman Paul Volcker (August
1979–July 1987) re-created the Martin LAW-with-credibility procedures, al-
beit with a nominal anchor in the form of the expectation of low, steady inﬂa-
tion rather than price stability. In doing so, he removed the procyclical bias of
money growth characterized as “stop-go.” FOMC chairmanAlan Greenspan
(August 1987–January 2006) continued the Volcker version of LAW with
credibility. Both Volcker and Greenspan accepted responsibility for the be-
havior of inﬂationary expectations as a prerequisite for controlling inﬂation.
After 1979, given the sensitivity of ﬁnancial markets to inﬂation, symbolized
by the “bond market vigilantes,” the result was largely to remove the cycli-
cal inertia in funds rate movements that had characterized the earlier stop-go
period. The signiﬁcant degree of economic stability that characterized the
Volcker-Greenspan era earned the appellation of The Great Moderation.
However, in the Volcker-Greenspan era, the FOMC departed from the
baseline LAW-with-credibility procedures twice. In each instance, mini go-
stop cycles ensued. The go phases began with a reluctance to raise the funds
rate in response to strong real growth because of a concern that the foreign
exchange value of the dollar would rise. The ﬁrst episode occurred with the
Louvre Accord in early 1987 and the second occurred with the Asia crisis,
which began in earnest in the fall of 1997 (Hetzel 2008a, Chs. 14, 17–19).
Each time, with a lag, inﬂation began to rise and with the rise in inﬂation the
FOMC responded with signiﬁcant funds rate increases.3
3 Based on the observation that the funds rate lay below the funds rate forecast by a
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LAW with credibility treats the interest rate as part of the price system
and creates a nominal anchor by stabilizing the public’s expectation of inﬂa-
tion. TheLAWcharacteristicofmovingthefundsrateinresponsetosustained
changesinratesofresourceutilizationembodiesasearchprocedurefordiscov-
ering the natural interest rate. The constraint that ﬁnancial markets anticipate
that,inresponsetomacroeconomicshocks,theFed’srulewillcausefundsrate
changes to cumulate to whatever extent necessary to prevent a change in the
trend inﬂation rate set by the central bank’s (implicit) inﬂation target creates
a nominal anchor in the form of the expectation of low, stable inﬂation. By
maintaining expected inﬂation equal to its steady (albeit implicit) target for
inﬂation, the Fed controls the nominal expectational environment that shapes
the price-setting behavior of forward-looking ﬁrms setting prices over multi-
ple periods. Credibility thus allows the Fed to control trend inﬂation while
allowing inﬂation shocks (relative price changes that pass through to the price
level) to cause headline (total or noncore) inﬂation to ﬂuctuate around trend
inﬂation.4
Friedman (1960, 87) proposed a rule for steady money growth because of
the assumption that responding directly to inﬂation creates monetary shocks




policy was accommodative, Taylor (2009) argues that monetary policy under Chairman Greenspan
contributed to the run-up in house prices starting in 2003 (Taylor 2009, Figure 6). Hetzel (2008a,
Ch. 22, Appendix) criticizes the use of estimated Taylor rules to characterize FOMC behavior. Es-
timated Taylor-rule regressions are reduced forms that capture the interrelated behavior of inﬂation,
cyclical movements in the economy, and short-term interest rates, but not structural relationships
(an FOMC reaction function) running from the behavior of the economy to the FOMC’s funds
rate target. One important reason that estimated Taylor rules do not express a structural relation-
ship is the misspeciﬁcation that arises from omitting a central variable shaping FOMC behavior in
the Volcker-Greenspan era, namely, expected inﬂation. Another problem with Taylor rules is that
there are many different ways of measuring the right-hand variables: inﬂation relative to target,
the output gap, and the “equilibrium” real rate that appears in the constant term. One can easily
choose these variables to arrive at contradictory assessments of the stance of monetary policy. For
example, Mehra (2008, Figure 22) ﬁts the period after 2002 very well using a Taylor rule with
core PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inﬂation.
In 2003–4, the public was pessimistic about the future because of the decline in equity
wealth after 2000, the 9/11 terrorist attack with the fear that more attacks were imminent, and the
corporate governance scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. At the same time, productivity growth
was soaring, perhaps because of the earlier investment in information technology. The economy
needed a low real rate of interest (a low cost of consuming today in terms of foregone consumption
tomorrow) to provide the contemporaneous consumption and investment demand necessary to absorb
the supply of goods coming onto the market. If Taylor were correct that monetary policy was
expansionary starting in 2003, inﬂation would not have remained near the FOMC’s implicit inﬂation
target, which I take to be 2 percent core PCE inﬂation.
4 This latter characterization clashes with Taylor-rule prescriptions, which require the central
bank to respond directly to realized inﬂation. According to the characterization here of LAW with
credibility, the FOMC does not respond to inﬂation shocks that exercise only a transitory inﬂuence
on inﬂation as long as they leave expectations of trend inﬂation unchanged (see footnote 3 on the
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to rise. I argue in the next section that the world’s major central banks, in the
summer of 2008, despite deteriorating economic activity, became unwilling
to lower their policy rates because of fear that headline inﬂation in excess of
core inﬂation would raise inﬂationary expectations. The resulting monetary
stringency turned a moderate recession into a major recession.
The FOMC’s LAW-with-credibility procedures possess a straightforward
interpretation in terms of monetary control. Through a rule that makes the
real funds rate track the natural rate as a consequence of its interest rate target,
the Fed accommodates the demand for money associated with trend growth
in the real economy. Money growth then equals the following components:
(1) an amount consistent with trend real growth; (2) expected trend inﬂation
(the FOMC’s implicit inﬂation target); (3) changes in the demand for money
because of changes in market interest rates relative to the own rate on money;
(4) random changes in the demand for money; and (5) transitory deviations
of headline inﬂation from trend inﬂation because of inﬂation shocks (Hetzel
2005, 2006, and 2008b). If the FOMC departs from such a rule so that the
real funds rate does a poor job of tracking the natural rate, as explained by
Wicksell ([1898] 1962), the resulting money creation (for a real interest rate
below the natural rate) or money destruction (for a real interest rate above the
natural rate) will engender instability in the price level.
However, given both instability in money demand and heightened interest
sensitivity of money demand since 1981 and, recently, given inﬂation shocks,
money growth has become uninformative about whether monetary policy is
expansionary or contractionary measured according to the Wicksellian crit-
erion of central bank success in tracking the real interest rate. As a result, the
Friedman (1960) rule for steady money growth is not feasible. The FOMC’s
pragmatically derived LAW-with-credibility procedures are a better alterna-
tive. Even with stability of money demand, as long as the FOMC follows
procedures such that the real funds rate tracks the natural rate, money pos-
sesses no predictive power for inﬂation.
4. MONETARY POLICY IN 2008
What caused the appearance of a deep recession after almost three decades
of relatively mild economic ﬂuctuations? The explanation here highlights a
monetary policy shock in the form of a failure by the Fed to follow a decline
in the natural interest rate with reductions in the funds rate.5 Speciﬁcally,
5 The issue of whether Taylor rules usefully characterize FOMC behavior, discussed in foot-
note 3, should not be an issue in characterizing monetary policy in the summer of 2008. The
assessment here that monetary policy became contractionary in the summer of 2008 should be con-
sistent with Taylor-rule assessments. For the period from early 2004 through the summer of 2008,
year-over-year percentage changes in the core PCE had remained steady within a narrow range
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the absence of a funds rate reduction betweenApril 30, 2008, and October 8,
2008 (or only a quarter-percentage-point reduction between March 18, 2008,
andOctober8,2008),despitedeteriorationineconomicactivity,representeda
contractionarydeparturefromthepolicyofLAWwithcredibility.6 Frommid-
March 2008 through mid-September 2008, M2 barely rose while bank credit
fell somewhat (Board of Governors 2009a). Moreover, the FOMC effectively
tightened monetary policy in June by pushing up the expected path of the
federal funds rate through the hawkish statements of its members. In May
2008, federal funds futures had been predicting a basically unchanged funds
rate at 2 percent for the remainder of 2008. However, by June 18, futures
markets predicted a funds rate of 2.5 percent for November 2008.7
TheU.S.economyweakenedsteadilythroughout2008. PositiverealGDP
growthin2008:Q2initiallyappearedreassuring,butthe2.8percentannualized
real growth that quarter was more than accounted for by an unsustainable
increase in net exports, which added 2.9 percentage points to GDP growth
(“ﬁnal” ﬁgures available at the end of September 2008). By mid-July, it had
become apparent that the temporary ﬁllip to consumer expenditure offered
the August 5, 2008, FOMC meeting, “most participants anticipated that core inﬂation would edge
back down during 2009.” Presumably, that would place inﬂation at or below what I take to be the
FOMC’s 2 percent implicit inﬂation target. Although inﬂation remained near target, the negative
output gap widened. The August 5, 2008, FOMC Minutes noted (Board 2008, 4, 6): “[T]he staff
continued to expect that real GDP would rise at less than its potential rate through the ﬁrst half
of next year.... [M]embers agreed that labor markets had softened further, that ﬁnancial markets
remained under considerable stress, and that these factors—in conjunction with still-elevated energy
prices and the ongoing housing contraction—would likely weigh on economic growth in coming
quarters.”
However, the FOMC, focused on a concern that persistent, high headline inﬂation would raise
the public’s expectation of inﬂation, kept the funds rate unchanged at 2 percent. The August 5,
2008, FOMC Minutes note (Board 2008, 6): “Participants expressed signiﬁcant concerns about the
upside risks to inﬂation, especially the risk that persistent high headline inﬂation could result in
an unmooring of long-run inﬂation expectations.... [M]embers generally anticipated that the next
policy move would likely be a tightening...”
Taylor-rule estimation results available from Macroeconomic Advisers (2009) are striking. The
“Backward-Looking Policy Rule” graph shows the funds rate forecast falling to −7.3 percent in
2010:Q3. By 2011:Q1, deﬂation sets in.
6 Macroeconomic Advisers (2008b, 1), managed by former Fed governor Laurence Meyer and
whose publications discuss monetary policy through the perspective of credit markets rather than
money creation, also argued that monetary policy was restrictive: “Over the period that ended
in April [2008], the FOMC strategy was to ease aggressively in order to offset the tightening
of ﬁnancial conditions arising from wider credit spreads, more stringent lending standards, and
falling equity prices. We said that the FOMC was ‘running to stand still,’ in that those actions
did not create accommodative ﬁnancial conditions but were needed to keep them from becoming
signiﬁcantly tighter. Since the last easing [April 2008], however, the FOMC has abandoned that
strategy. Financial conditions have arguably tightened more severely since April than during the
earlier period, and yet there has been no policy offset. This pattern has contributed importantly
to the severe weakening of the economic outlook in our forecast.”
7 The Fed was not alone in encouraging the expectation of higher rates. The Financial Times
(Giles 2008) in a story with the headline, “BIS Calls for World Interest Rate Rises,” reported:
“Malcolm Knight, outgoing general manager, and William White, outgoing chief economist, con-
cluded in the report: ‘It is not fanciful, surely, to suggest that these low levels of interest rates
might inadvertently have encouraged imprudent borrowing, as well as the eventual resurgence of
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by the tax rebate had run its course.8 Retail sales for June, with numbers
available July 15, increased only .1 percent. In mid-July, USA Today (2008)
ran a front-page headline, “Signs of a growing crisis: ‘Relentless ﬂow’of bad
economic news suggests there’s no easy way out.” From June 2008 through
September 2008, industrial production fell 5.4 percent (not at an annualized
rate).
The steady weakening in economic activity appeared in payroll employ-
ment, which stopped growing in December 2007 and then turned consistently
negative. The unemployment rate rose steadily from 4.7 percent in November
2007 to 6.1 percent in September 2008. Macroeconomic Advisers (2008c, 1)
forecast below-trend growth for 2008:Q3 from May onward (consistently be-
low2percentandnearzerostartinginOctober). Itforecastlessthan1percent
growth for 2008:Q4 starting in August and −1 percent starting in October.9
Macroeconomic Advisers was among the most optimistic of forecasters. The
consensus forecasts reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (2008) on July
1, 2008, for 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4, respectively, were 1.2 percent and .9
percent. OnAugust 1, they were 1 percent and .3 percent.
The recession intensiﬁed in 2008:Q3 (annualized real GDP growth of −.5
percent). That fact suggests that, prior to the signiﬁcant wealth destruction
fromthesharpfallinequitymarketsaftermid-September2008, therealfunds
rate already exceeded the natural rate. The huge wealth destruction after that
date must have further depressed the natural interest rate and made monetary
policy even more restrictive. It follows that the fundamental reason for the
heightened decline in economic activity in 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1 was inertia
in the decline in the funds rate relative to a decline in the natural rate produced
bythecontinuedfallinrealincomefromthehousingpriceandinﬂationshock
reinforced by a dramatic quickening in the fall in equity wealth.
In 2008, all the world’s major central banks introduced inertia in their
interest rate targets relative to the cyclical decline in output. The European
CentralBank(ECB)focusedonhigherwagesettlementsinGermany,Italy,and
8 Governor Kohn (2008, 1–2) characterized the behavior of the economy during the summer
of 2008: “During the summer, it became increasingly clear that a downshifting in the pace of
economic activity was in train....[R]eal consumer outlays fell from June through August, putting
real consumer spending for the third quarter as a whole on track to decline for the ﬁrst time
since 1991. Business investment also appears to have slowed over the summer. Orders and ship-
ments for nondefense capital goods have weakened, on net, in recent months, pointing to a de-
cline in real outlays for new business equipment. Similarly, outlays for nonresidential construction
projects edged lower in July and August after rising at a robust pace over the ﬁrst half of this
year....[C]onditions in housing markets have remained on a downward trajectory.”
9 Macroeconomic Advisers (2008b) wrote: “By abandoning its ‘offset’ approach [of lowering
the funds rate in response to tightening conditions in ﬁnancial markets], the Federal Reserve has
allowed ﬁnancial conditions to tighten substantially.... Another reason why the Fed abandoned its
approach is that it has focused primarily on expanding its liquidity policies in recent months. The
FOMC believes that liquidity policies are more effective tools for providing assistance to market
functioning.... But even if one accepts (as we do) that liquidity tools are better suited for helping
market functioning, monetary policy still has to react to changes in the outlook.”R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 215
the Netherlands (Financial Times 2008) and in July 2008 raised the interbank
rate to 4.25 percent. Although annualized real GDP growth in the Euro area
declined in 2008:Q1, 2008:Q2, and 2008:Q3, respectively, from 2.8 percent,
to −1 percent, to −1 percent, the ECB began lowering its bank rate only on
October 8, 2008. In Great Britain, the Bank of England kept the bank rate at
5 percent through the summer, unchanged after a quarter-point reduction on
April 10. From 2007:Q4 through 2008:Q3, annualized real GDP growth rates
inGreatBritaindeclined, respectively, from2.2percent, to1.6percent, to−.1
percent,andthento−2.8percent. (TheBankofEnglandalsolowereditsbank
rate by 50 basis points on October 8, 2008.) In Japan, for the quarters from
2007:Q4–2008:Q3, annualized real GDP growth declined from 4.0 percent,
to 1.4 percent, to −4.5 percent, to −1.4 percent. The Bank of Japan kept its
interbank rate at .5 percent, unchanged from February 2007, until October
31, 2008, when it lowered the rate to .3 percent. The fact that the severe
contraction in output began in all these countries in 2008:Q2 is more readily
explained by a common restrictive monetary policy than by contagion from
the then still-mild U.S. recession.
Inearlyfall2008,therealizationemergedthatrecessionwouldnotbecon-
ﬁned to the United States but would be worldwide. That realization, as much
as the difﬁculties caused by the Lehman bankruptcy, produced the decrease in
equitywealthinthefallof2008asevidencedbythefactthatbroadmeasuresof
equity markets fell by the same amount as the value of bank stocks. Between
September 19, 2008, and October 27, 2008, theWilshire 5000 stock index fell
34 percent. Over this period, the KBW bank equity index fell 38 percent.10
Between 2007:Q3 and 2008:Q4, the net worth of households fell 19.9 per-
cent with a fall of 9 percent in 2008:Q4 alone (Board of Governors 2009b).
Signiﬁcant declines in household wealth have occurred at other times, for ex-
ample, in 1969–1970, 1974–1975, and 2000–2003. However, during those
declines in wealth, consumption has always been considerably more stable, at
least since 1955 when the wealth series became available. That fact renders
especially striking the sharp decline in the growth rate of real personal con-
sumption expenditures from 1.2 percent in 2008:Q2 to −3.8 percent and −4.3
percent in 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4. This decline in consumption suggests that
the public expected the fall in wealth to be permanent. The sharp rise in the
unemployment rate from 5.0 percent inApril 2008 to 8.1 percent in February
10 The failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, created uncertainty in ﬁnancial
markets. Hetzel (2009a) argues that the primary shock arose from a discrete increase in risk due to
the sudden reversal of the prevailing assumption in ﬁnancial markets that the debt of large ﬁnancial
institutions was insured against default by the ﬁnancial safety net. A clear, consistent government
policy about the extent of the ﬁnancial safety net would likely have avoided the uncertainty arising
from market counterparties suddenly having to learn which institutions held the debt of investment
banks and then having to evaluate the solvency of these institutions. Nevertheless, the turmoil in
ﬁnancial markets and the losses incurred by banks would likely have been manageable without the
emergence of worldwide recession.216 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2009 added to individual pessimism and uncertainty about the future. These
factors must have produced a decline in the natural rate.
Restrictive monetary policy rather than the deleveraging in ﬁnancial mar-
kets that had begun in August 2007 offers a more direct explanation of the
intensiﬁcation of the recession that began in the summer of 2008. By then,
U.S. ﬁnancial markets were reasonably calm.11 The intensiﬁcation of the
recession began before the ﬁnancial turmoil that followed the September
15, 2008, Lehman bankruptcy.12 Although from mid-2007 through mid-
December 2008, ﬁnancial institutions reported losses of $1 trillion dollars,
they also raised $930 billion in capital—$346 billion from governments and
$585 billion from the private sector (Institute of International Finance 2008,
2).13
Inthisrecession, unliketheotherrecessionsthatfollowedtheDepression,
commentators have assigned causality to dysfunction in credit markets. For
example, Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2008) wrote about “the
origins of the crisis in the collapse of an asset price bubble and consequent
disintegration of the credit mechanism....” This view implies a structural
break in the cyclical behavior of bank lending: In the current recession, bank
lending should have been a leading indicator and should have declined more
signiﬁcantly than in past recessions. However, Figure 1, which shows the
behavior of real (inﬂation-adjusted) bank loans in recessions, reveals that
11 The initial deleveraging appeared in the decline of ABCP (asset-backed commercial paper)
from $1.2 trillion in August 2007 to $800 billion in December 2007. Thereafter, ABCP outstand-
ing basically remained steady until mid-September 2008 (declining somewhat in May 2008 and
then recovering in early September). Both retail and institutional money funds grew between Au-
gust 2007 and mid-September 2008. In August 2008, nonﬁnancial commercial paper outstanding
had recovered the $200 billion level it reached in August 2007 and then grew strongly in early
September 2008. Financial commercial paper remained steady over the entire period from August
2007 to mid-September 2008. The corporate Aaa rate also remained steady at 5.5 percent over
this latter period. Although the KBW index of the stocks of large banks lost half its value from
mid-July 2007 through mid-July 2008, it climbed 50 percent from mid-July 2008 through mid-
September 2008. The steadiness of the monetary base until mid-September 2008 does not suggest
any unusual demand for liquidity from the Fed (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2009).
12 The quarterly annualized growth rates for ﬁnal sales to domestic purchasers (GDP minus
the effects of inventories and net exports) weakened in 2008:Q3 (after a modest uptick in 2008:Q2
caused by the tax rebates and fall in net exports). The ﬁgures are as follows: 2007:Q4 (−.1
percent), 2008:Q1 (.1 percent), 2008:Q2 (1.3 percent), 2008:Q3 (−2.3 percent), and 2008:Q4 (−5.7
percent). Payroll employment, which is measured in the ﬁrst week of the month, declined by
284,000 in September 2008 compared to the average decline of around 60,000 from February
through August (11/7/08 BLS release). The decline of 240,000 jobs in October 2008 does include
two weeks of the ﬁnancial turmoil in the last half of September, but the lag is too short to have
produced signiﬁcant layoffs. The Dunkelberg and Wade (September 2008) survey of small business
owners did not record deterioration in the availability of credit to small businesses between the
ﬁrst and last part of September 2008.
13 On May 7, 2009, regulators released the results of “stress tests” for the 19 largest bank
holding companies (BHCs), which hold 98 percent of commercial bank assets. According to the ac-
companying report, “At year-end 2008, capital ratios at all 19 BHCs exceeded minimum regulatory
capital standards, in many cases by substantial margins.” Even under the “adverse scenario” these
institutions would experience “virtually no shortfall in overall Tier 1 capital” (Board of Governors
2009c).R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 217
























Notes: Starting in October 2008, the series has been adjusted for the acquisition of a
large nonbank institution by a commercial bank. Data are deﬂated using the overall CPI.
Shaded areas indicate the NBER recessions.
Source: Board of Governors 2009a.
bank lending behaved similarly in this recession to other post-war recessions.
Moreover, the fact that bank lending rose in the severe 1981–1982 recession
and often recovered only after cyclical troughs suggests that bank lending is
not a reliable tool for the management of aggregate demand.
Basedonthejudgmentthatdysfunctionincreditmarketswasthecauseof
the intensiﬁcation of the recession, governments and central banks intervened
massivelyinﬁnancialmarkets. Startingwiththetermauctionfacility(TAF)in
December 2007, the Fed initiated programs to lower risk premia in particular
markets through its assumption of private credit risk. Since September 15,
2008, the Fed has taken an unprecedented amount of private debt onto its
balancesheetinanattempttoinﬂuencetheﬂowofcreditinparticularmarkets.
The size of its balance sheet went from about $800 billion before September
15, 2008, to more than $2,000 trillion at year-end 2008. It has lent to ﬁnancial
institutions through the discount window (with the primary credit facility to218 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
banks, as well as the primary dealer credit facility and TAF) and to foreign
centralbanksthroughcurrencyswaps. Ithaspurchasedsigniﬁcantamountsof
commercialpaperthroughthecommercialpaperfundingfacilityinanattempt
to revive that market.
Government has taken over signiﬁcant amounts of portfolio risk in large
ﬁnancial institutions, in particular, AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America.
TheTreasuryhassupportedthegovernment-sponsoredenterprises(GSEs)and
the deposits of money market mutual funds. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Coporation has guaranteed the debt of large commercial banks and small
industrial banks and has extended the coverage of insured deposits. Troubled
AssetReliefProgrammoneyhasaddedcapitaltothebankingsystem. Foreign
governments have implemented similar programs.
Perhaps the scale of this intervention in credit markets has simply been
insufﬁcient to overcome ﬁnancial market malfunction. Still, the scale of the
intervention has been vast. If the problem has not been ﬁnancial market
dysfunction but rather has been misalignment between the real funds rate
and the natural rate, then intervention in credit markets will only increase
intermediation in the subsidized markets. Those subsidies will not reduce
aggregaterisktothepointthattheoverallcostoffundsfallsenoughtostimulate
investment by businesses and consumers. Government intervention in credit
markets is, then, not a reliable tool for the management of aggregate demand
because such interventions do little to reduce the public’s uncertainty and
pessimism about the future that have depressed the natural rate.
To understand why policymakers are now at a crossroads about how to
think about monetary policy, consider the reasons for the widespread unwill-
ingness to lower the funds rate in the summer of 2008. There was a consensus
that monetary policy was “accommodative” as evidenced by the low level of
the nominal funds rate and realized real funds rate (the nominal rate minus
realized inﬂation). The debate revolved around whether the “low” level of the
funds rate was appropriate given slow growth in the economy or whether it
wouldleadtoariseininﬂation. Therewasasharedconcernthatheadlineinﬂa-
tion persistently in excess of participants’implicit inﬂation objectives would
raise the public’s expectation of inﬂation above the lower, basically satisfac-
tory, core inﬂation rate and thereby propagate the higher headline inﬂation
rate into the future.
As evidenced by a Wall Street Journal (Evans 2008) headline on the day
of theAugust FOMC meeting (“Price Increases Ramp Up, Sounding Inﬂation
Alarm”), the increase in energy and food prices had signiﬁcantly increased
headline inﬂation. The numbers available at the meeting showed three-month
headline consumer price index (CPI) inﬂation ending in June 2008 at 7.9 per-
cent with 12-month inﬂation at 5.0 percent. The corresponding core (ex food
andenergy)CPIﬁgureswere,respectively,2.5percentand2.4percent. Forthe
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was 5.7 percent with the 12-month number at 3.8 percent. The correspond-
ing core PCE ﬁgures were, respectively, 2.1 percent and 2.3 percent. Earlier,
ChairmanBernanke(2008)hadsignaledconcernthatinﬂationaryexpectations
could increase, as well as a concern that the dollar would depreciate:
Another signiﬁcant upside risk to inﬂation is that high headline
inﬂation, if sustained, might lead the public to expect higher long-
term inﬂation rates, an expectation that could ultimately become self-
conﬁrming....W eareattentive to the implications of changes in the value
of the dollar for inﬂation and inﬂation expectations and will continue to
formulate policy to guard against risks to both parts of our dual mandate,
including the risk of an erosion in longer-term inﬂation expectations.
In its regular publication “FOMC Chatter,” Macroeconomic Advisers
(2008a, 1) reviewed the public statements of FOMC participants made be-
fore the June 2008 FOMC meeting:
FOMC members left little doubt about their concerns regarding longer-
term inﬂation expectations. Chairman Bernanke (6/9/08) said that the
FOMC “will strongly resist” any increase in expectations, Vice Chairman
Kohn (6/11/08) said that keeping expectations anchored is “critical,” and
Governor Mishkin (6/10/08) said that it is “absolutely critical.”...President
Fisher (6/10/08) said that an increase in expectations is “the worst con-
ceivable thing that can happen.” Presidents Plosser (6/12/08), Bullard
(6/11/08), and Lacker each emphasized the need to tighten promptly
enough to prevent any increase in inﬂation expectations.14
What is the crossroads that policymakers face? The view that in the sum-
mer of 2008 monetary policy was accommodative combined with the associ-
ation of ﬁnancial market disruption with intensiﬁcation of the recession has
led to a revival of the credit-cycle view of cyclical instability. Current debate
has recreated much of the sentiment expressed by the Board of Governors
in the 1920s that regulatory constraints on credit extension should comple-
ment the funds rate as a mechanism for controlling excessive risk-taking by
14 Statements by FOMC participants before the August 5, 2008, FOMC meeting reported by
Macroeconomic Advisers (2008b) included the following:
“President Plosser (7/23/08 and 7/22/08): ‘Most of us agree that inﬂation expectations are OK.
I think it’s important that we act before those expectations become unhinged....If we remain overly
accommodative in the face of these large relative price shocks to energy and other commodities,
we will ensure that they will translate into more broad-based inﬂation that—once ingrained in
expectations—will become very difﬁcult to undo.’
President Hoenig (7/9/08): ‘I think it is important to understand that we are in an accom-
modative position, and the implications of that [are that] the inﬂation we have will most likely
continue in the future...’
President Yellen (7/7/08): ‘Inﬂation has become an increasing concern....On balance, I still
see inﬂation expectations as reasonably well anchored....But the risks to inﬂation are likely not
symmetric and they have deﬁnitely increased. We cannot and will not allow a wage-price spiral
to develop.’ ”220 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
banks. Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 254) wrote, “[T]he view attributed
to the Board [in the 1920s] was that direct pressure was a feasible means of
restricting the availability of credit for speculative purposes without unduly
restricting its availability for productive purposes, whereas rises in discount
rates or open market sales sufﬁciently severe to curb speculation would be too
severe for business in general.” Just as in the Depression with the use of the
ReconstructionFinanceCorporationtorecapitalizebanks,thefocusofcurrent
monetary policy is on encouraging ﬁnancial intermediation (seeAppendix).
The alternative road lies with the extension of the policy changes taken
in the Volcker-Greenspan era. In this spirit, the FOMC should be willing to
move the funds rate up and down to whatever extent necessary to respond to
changes in rates of resource utilization. The issue then is credibility. With
credibility, in the event of an inﬂation shock, the FOMC can still move the
funds rate down to zero without an increase in inﬂationary expectations. The
absence of an explicit inﬂation target voted on by the entire FOMC would
appear as a weakness in current procedures. An explicit inﬂation target then
raises the issue of how to interpret the Fed mandate for “stable prices” and
whether that part of the mandate conﬂicts with “maximum employment.”15
Also, as discussed in the next section, the absence of an explicit strategy for
dealing with the ZLB problem is a deﬁciency.
5. MONETARY POLICYAND THE ZERO-LOWER-BOUND
PROBLEM
The hypothesis advanced here is that the accelerated loss of wealth in the fall
of2008pushedthenaturalinterestratefurtherbelowtherealinterestrate. The
Fed began again to lower the funds rate on October 10, 2008 (from 2 percent
to 1.5 percent), and on October 29 to 1 percent and on December 16, 2008, to
a range from 0 percent to .25 percent. At the time of this writing (May 2009),
tentative indications of a cyclical trough in 2009:Q2 indicate that these funds
15 Hetzel (2008a, Ch. 20) argues that the FOMC abandoned price stability for an objective
of low inﬂation in 2003. With the emergence in the summer of 2004 of an inﬂation shock due
to a sustained rise in energy prices, the desired low inﬂation rate of about 2 percent became
a base for markedly higher headline inﬂation. In the summer of 2008, the persistence of high
headline inﬂation caused credibility concerns among all the world’s major central banks. From this
perspective, the FOMC would have been better off to have preserved the price stability that had
emerged in 2003. However, price stability gives the FOMC less room to create a negative real
funds rate. Board of Governors Vice Chairman Don Kohn and Paul Volcker debated the issues
recently at a conference in Nashville, Tenn. (Blackstone 2009): “Mr. Volcker...questioned how the
Fed can talk about both 2% inﬂation and price stability. ‘I don’t get it,’ Mr. Volcker said....By
setting 2% as an inﬂation objective, the Fed is ‘telling people in a generation they’re going to be
losing half their purchasing power.’ Mr. Kohn...replied that aiming at 2% inﬂation gives the Fed
‘a little more room...to react to an adverse shock to the economy’ because it is easier to get its
key short-term interest rate below the inﬂation rate, the usual remedy for recession. ‘Your problem
is [2%] becomes three becomes four,’ Mr. Kohn told Mr. Volcker. But other central banks with
a roughly 2% target haven’t had that problem, he said.”R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 221
rate reductions may have restored monetary neutrality by pushing the real rate
in line with the natural interest rate or may have provided monetary stimulus
by pushing the real rate below the natural rate. In any event, it is desirable
for the FOMC to possess a strategy for providing monetary stimulus with a
zero-funds rate that coexists with a real funds rate in excess of the natural
interest rate.16
How should central banks deal with the ZLB problem? To begin, note
that a discrete increase in the degree of monetary instability (measured by an
increase in the unpredictability of the evolution of the price level precipitated
byadepartureofthecentralbankfromastabilizingrule)depressesthenatural
rate of interest, albeit in a way that does not allow for its systematic manipu-
lation. The reason is that unanticipated monetary restriction causes the price
system to convey information about the relative scarcity of resources less efﬁ-
ciently. Becauseoftheunanticipatednatureofthemonetaryshock, thereisno
way for ﬁrms to lower the dollar prices of their products in a coordinated way
that preserves relative prices. Because individuals become more pessimistic
aboutthefuture(expectedconsumptionfallsrelativetocurrentconsumption),
the natural rate falls.
With a zero-funds rate, monetary policy is contractionary if the natural
rate (NR) lies below the negative value of expected inﬂation (−πe); that is,
the real rate (rr) exceeds the natural rate: rr = (0 − πe)>N R . Assuming
that the central bank cannot manipulate short-term expected inﬂation, it must
resort to money creation to raise the natural rate. Sustained money creation
will revive the spending of the public through a portfolio rebalancing effect.
The natural rate rises with no increase in expected inﬂation as the increase in
spending restores conﬁdence in the economy.
The proposal here for providing monetary stimulus at the ZLB in reces-
sionisfortheFedtoengageinsigniﬁcantopenmarketpurchasesoflong-term
government securities to boost the monetary aggregate M2 to a level that con-
stitutes a signiﬁcant fraction of GDP and then to maintain signiﬁcant growth
of M2 until recovery begins. (The ratio of M2 to GDP, the inverse of velocity,
has been somewhat in excess of 50 percent in recent years.) The Treasury
could issue these securities directly to the Fed and use the proceeds to fund
expenditure rather than reduce its debt. With the emergence of a nascent re-
covery, the Fed would again make the funds rate positive. A positive funds
16 To understand how excessive pessimism could yield a negative natural rate, consider a
hypothetical agrarian economy without money that produces wheat. Rats eat some fraction of
stored wheat, say, 3 percent. If individuals are pessimistic enough about future harvests, they will
be willing to store wheat despite a real interest rate of −3 percent. (Milton Friedman used this
example in a 1967 course taught at the University of Chicago.)222 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
rate would absorb the monetary overhang that will emerge with economic
recovery and positive interest rates.17
The reason for an initial large increase in money is uncertainty over the
lag between monetary acceleration and economic recovery. Friedman and
Schwartz (1963b) documented a two-to-three-quarter lag between changes
in money growth and changes in growth of nominal expenditure. Friedman
used this estimate to forecast successfully the behavior of the business cycle
in the stop-go period of monetary policy. However, in recessions in the stop-
go period, because of the high level of interest rates, the Fed could push the
nominal funds rate down until the real funds rate fell below the natural rate.
The cyclical trough in GDP during that period occurred after monetary policy
became expansionary by this Wicksellian measure. If indeed the real rate
exceeds the natural rate at the ZLB, to reach this position, money must ﬁrst
expandbyenoughtostimulateexpendituresufﬁcientlytoraisethenaturalrate
up to and then above the real funds rate.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENT
Thecompanionpiecetothispaper(Hetzel2009a)beginswithagraphofoutput
per capita from 1970 to the present. The graph displays a dramatic rising
trend but also signiﬁcant departures below trend. The rising trend highlights
how free markets create wealth. The departures below trend point to times
of widespread misery during recession. Given the insatiability of human
wants, macroeconomics must explain why, at times, individuals demand less
output than is consistent with full utilization of productive resources. What
prevents the price system from adjusting to prevent periodic underutilization
of resources?
Hetzel (2008a) answers that central banks have exacerbated cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations through introducing inertia at cyclical peaks into declines in the real
interest rate with money destruction (deceleration) and through introducing
inertia at cyclical troughs into increases in the real interest rate with money
creation (acceleration). Hetzel (2008a) also argues for explicit recognition of
LAW with credibility as a rule. In the Volcker-Greenspan era, these proce-
duresallowedmarketforcestodeterminetherealinterestratewhileproviding
a nominal anchor in the form of stable, low expected inﬂation. At present,
thereisnoconsensusabouteitherthedesirabilityofamonetaryruleingeneral
or about the particular form of a rule. The Fed should take responsibility for
achievementofsuchaconsensusbyexplainingitsbehaviorintermsofwhatis
17An excess supply of money would lead the public to buy Treasury securities from banks
thereby reducing demand deposits and money. As a consequence of maintaining its funds rate
target, the Fed would then sell Treasury securities from its portfolio to absorb the accompanying
reduction in the demand for reserves by banks.R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 223
consistent over time in its behavior and by highlighting in its Minutes reasons
for departures. Such communication would allow an ongoing debate with the
academic community about policy.18
Knut Wicksell ([1935] 1978, 3) wrote in his Lectures on Political
Economy:
[W]ith regard to money, everything is determined by human beings
themselves, i.e. the statesmen, and (so far as they are consulted) the
economists; the choice of a measure of value, of a monetary system, of
currency and credit legislation—all are in the hands of society....
Wicksell followed up by noting:
The establishment of a greater, and if possible absolute, stability in
the value of money has thus become one of the most important practical
objectives of political economy. But, unfortunately, little progress towards
the solution of this problem has, so far, been made.
As Wicksell noted, the monetary arrangements of a country are subject
to rational design. However, since the founding of the Republic, a weakness
in American institutions has been the inability to bring monetary institutions
into the general constitutional framework. If the United States is to preserve
the ability of free markets to create wealth, economists and policymakers,
along with the general public, will have to use the current situation to design
monetary arrangements capable of assuring economic stability.
Dialogue between monetary policymakers and the academic community
is one of the important means through which such a constructive response can
emerge. Central banks have done little in the past to prepare for such a dia-
logue. William McChesney Martin, FOMC chairman from March 1951 until
January 1970, established the practice of moving short-term money market
rates of interest (later the funds rate) in response to the behavior of economic
activity. Policymakersthentalkedaboutmonetarypolicyusingthedescriptive
language of the business economist, that is, in terms of near-term forecasts
of the economy. They characterized funds rate changes as chosen optimally
period-by-period in the context of the contemporaneous behavior of the econ-
omy. This language of discretion implicitly rejects the Lucas ([1976] 1981)
critique, which argues for thinking of policy as a consistent strategy or rule.19
18At the same time, the political system needs to avoid destabilizing changes in policy that
affect signiﬁcant sectors of the economy. That means leaving the optimal stock of housing to
the operation of market forces rather than attempting to expand it through a panoply of special
programs and subsidies. It also means a credible commitment to a limited ﬁnancial safety net that
ends too-big-to-fail (Hetzel 2009a).
19 The Lucas critique argues for characterizing monetary policy as a consistent procedure
(reaction function or rule) for responding to incoming information rather than as a concatenation of
individual funds rate changes each of which is chosen as optimal in light of contemporary economic
conditions. The central bank should behave in a consistent fashion so that the public can predict224 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Without the language of economics, which places policy within the frame-
work of the price system and explicit frictions, and without the language of
rules, policymakerscannotdebateacademicsovercontrastingframeworksfor
thinking about monetary policy and the consequences of alternative policies
(Koopmans 1947).
The credit intermediation of commercial banks and the money creation
of central banks have proven difﬁcult to place within institutional frameworks
thatprotectpropertyrights(Hetzel1997). Debtguarantees, theGSEs, andthe
ﬁnancial safety net allow the political system to allocate credit to politically
inﬂuential constituencies in ways that do not appear on budget. Monetary
base creation provides tax revenue in the form of seigniorage that does not
require explicit legislation. Central bank independence is a safeguard against
the abuse of seigniorage, but that independence still allows for signiﬁcant
competition for control over the objectives of the central bank (Hetzel 1990).
In this adversarial environment, central banks do not systematically review
their history to evaluate what they did right and especially what they did
wrong. Without the learning provided by such review, they cannot contribute
to a debate on the optimal design of monetary policy.
The spirit of the critique offered here is that the Federal Reserve needs a
new dual mandate. It would charge the Fed with providing for price stability




APPENDIX: LESSONS FROM THE DEPRESSION
ThisAppendixsummarizesHetzel(2008a, Ch. 3). Untilrecently, theabsence
of credit allocation has deﬁned modern central banking. Because of the lack
of instances in which central banks used the composition of their balance
its response to shocks and, conversely, so that the central bank can inﬂuence the public’s behavior
in a predictable fashion (Lucas [1976] 1981). Lucas ([1980] 1981, 255) wrote: “[O]ur ability
as economists to predict the responses of agents rests, in situations where expectations about the
future matter, on our understanding of the stochastic [policy] environment agents believe themselves
to be operating in. In practice, this limits the class of policies the consequences of which we
can hope to assess in advance to policies generated by ﬁxed, well understood, relatively permanent
rules (or functions relating policy actions taken to the state of the economy)....[A]nalysis of policy
which utilizes economics in a scientiﬁc way necessarily involves choice among alternative stable,
predictable policy rules, infrequently changed and then only after extensive professional and general
discussion, minimizing (though, of course, never entirely eliminating) the role of discretionary
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sheet to affect the aggregate expenditure of the public by inﬂuencing credit
ﬂows, there is little historical basis for evaluating the efﬁcacy of credit policy.
However, experience in the Depression allows one to evaluate both credit-
channel and money-creation policies. Because the government implemented
credit policy in the Depression, these two policies followed different paths.
(If the Fed had expanded the asset side of its balance sheet to purchase debt in
marketsitdeemeddysfunctional,then,leftunsterilized,theassociatedincrease
in the monetary base would have confounded the credit and money creation
effects.) In the Depression, the government ran policies for intervening in
creditmarkets, forexample, byusingtheReconstructionFinanceCorporation
(RFC) to recapitalize banks. The resulting independence of money-creation
and credit-channel policies makes the Depression a laboratory for evaluating
the usefulness of these different policies for macroeconomic stabilization.
The founders of the Federal Reserve attributed ﬁnancial panics and reces-
sion to the inevitable collapse of asset speculation. As a result, they designed
the Federal ReserveAct according to the real-bills doctrine, which prescribed
limiting credit extension to the amount required to ﬁnance real bills (the self-
liquidating IOUs used to ﬁnance goods in the process of production). Such
limitation, it was hoped, would prevent an excess of credit creation that would
spill over into asset markets for land and stocks and create asset bubbles. In
1928, Fed policymakers believed that the increase in the value of stocks on
the NewYork Stock Exchange represented a speculative bubble that required
deﬂating (Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, 254ff, and Meltzer 2003, 224ff).
In 1928, the Fed started raising interest rates in order to bring down the
value of the stock market. Even after recession appeared, the Fed kept mar-
ket rates at a level high enough to prevent a reemergence of the speculation
presumedtohaveinitiatedaboom-bustcreditcycle. Itmaintainedpositivedis-
count window-borrowing, which together with a positive discount rate meant
keeping interest rates elevated. The resulting monetary contraction that led
to the initial recession turned that recession into a depression as a result of
a self-reinforcing cycle of monetary contraction, deﬂation, expected deﬂa-
tion, the transformation of positive nominal rates into high real rates, and then
reinforced monetary contraction and so on. (See Figures 3.1 and 3.4 on in-
ﬂation and money growth and Table 3.1 on nominal and real interest rates in
Hetzel [2008a].) Contractionary monetary policy appeared in the decline of
the money stock. From 1930:Q1 to 1933:Q2, M1 fell by 25 percent and M2
fell by 32 percent (money growth ﬁgures from Friedman and Schwartz [1970,
Table 1]). That decline in turn manifested itself in the failure of smaller banks
as depositors withdrew their deposits and redeposited them in larger banks,
which they considered safer (Walter 2005).
Two events ended the ﬁrst of the two back-to-back recessions that deﬁned
the Great Depression. First, in response to a series of bank failures ﬁnish-
ing in the winter of 1932–1933, banks accumulated large amounts of excess226 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
reserves as a source of funds alternative to borrowing from the discount win-
dow. From basically frictional levels in early 1932, member bank excess
reserves rose steadily through 1935. Borrowed reserves obtained through the
Fed’s discount window fell steadily after March 1933 until reaching frictional
levels in late 1933 or early 1934 (Board of Governors 1943b). When banks
had accumulated sufﬁcient excess reserves, they no longer required access to
the discount window to meet their marginal reserve needs, and the Fed no
longer determined market interest rates. The Fed then withdrew as an active
central bank and conﬁned itself to maintaining the size of its government se-
curities holdings at a ﬁxed level. As a result, the Fed gave up control over the
monetary base and money creation.
The second event critical to precipitating the initial recovery was
Roosevelt’s attempt to raise the domestic price level by raising commodity
prices through depreciation of the dollar. Gold purchases, along with the pro-
hibition on the export of gold, increased the dollar price of gold and, as a
result, the dollar prices of commodities, whose gold prices were determined
in international markets. The expectation of inﬂation that emerged from this
policy turned formerly high positive real interest rates into negative rates (see
Hetzel [2008a], Table 3.1). Very quickly, economic recovery replaced eco-
nomicdecline. Dollardevaluationinearly1934combinedwithpoliticalunrest
inEuropetocreategoldinﬂowsthataugmentedthemonetarybaseandmoney.
From 1933:Q2 to 1936:Q3, M1 grew at an annualized rate of 14.3 percent and
M2 at 11.4 percent. Money creation allowed the economy to grow vigorously
until 1937.
In the summer of 1936 and the ﬁrst half of 1937, the Fed acted on its
desire to again control market interest rates. Through a series of increases in
required reserves (effective August 1936, March 1937, and May 1937), the
Fed reduced banks’ excess reserves with the intention of forcing banks back
into the discount window and thus reviving its control over market rates. At
the same time, the Treasury began to sterilize gold inﬂows. The Fed’s intent
wastoresurrectitspre-1933operatingprocedures. Whenthedemandforbank
credit revived, banks would therefore have to obtain the additional reserves
associated with the increase in loans and deposits from the discount window.
Market rates would then rise and prevent a revival of the speculation that had
supposedly caused an unsustainable bubble in stock prices in the 1920s.
Asbanksattemptedtooffsettheirlossofexcessreserves, themoneystock
stopped growing. Money growth declined after 1936:Q3. Thereafter the level
ofmoneyfellmoderatelyfrom1937:Q1through1937:Q4. Thelevelofmoney
remained basically unchanged in the ﬁrst half of 1938. Money began to rise
when banks restored the pre-reserve-requirement level of excess reserves in
1938:Q2. Money then began to rise steadily, basically coincident with the
cyclical trough in June 1938 when recession replaced recovery. A chastened
Fed retreated from its attempt to again become an active central bank andR. L. Hetzel: Monetary Policy 227
continued to freeze its holdings of government securities. Monetary base and
moneygrowthresumedwithgoldinﬂowsandtheendofTreasurysterilization
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, Chart 40, and Friedman and Schwartz 1970,
Table 1). Because inﬂation (CPI) turned to deﬂation in 1937:Q4, the trough
in real M1 occurred in 1937:Q4. The return of growth after the business cycle
trough in June 1938 is consistent with the increase in real M1 stimulating
expenditure through portfolio rebalancing, that is, through a stimulative real-
balance effect (Patinkin 1948, 1965).
As summarized in the equation of exchange, nominal money (M) times
velocity (V), or the rate of turnover of money, equals dollar expenditure.
Dollarexpenditureequalsthepricelevel(P)timesrealoutput(y). Inalgebraic
terms, M • V = P • y. Without a Fed interest rate peg, short-term interest
rates could fall to zero. Furthermore, with money growth powered by gold
inﬂows, a return of expected deﬂation could not produce a return to the earlier
self-reinforcing downward monetary spiral. Because monetary velocity was
roughly steady, rapid money growth translated into rapid growth in aggregate
dollar spending (P • y). With deﬂation, this growth in nominal spending
appearedasgrowthinrealoutput(y)aftertheJune1938troughinthebusiness
cycle.
An important lesson emerges from the comparison of the interest-rate
targeting followed by the Fed until March 1933 with the succeeding period of
exogenous monetary base growth. Discussion in the popular press attributes
to deﬂation a depressing effect of economic activity. When the central bank
implements policy with an interest rate target, deﬂation that creates expected
deﬂation is destabilizing. However, if monetary base growth is exogenous,
deﬂation is stimulative because it increases real money and thereby induces
portfolio rebalancing and the associated increase in expenditure.
The experience of the Depression casts doubt on the credit-cycle view,
which emphasizes the disruption to real economic activity from the loss of
banksandtheresultinglossofinformationspeciﬁctoparticularcreditmarkets.
Ex-Fed Governor Frederic Mishkin (2008) expressed this idea:
In late 1930...arolling series of bank panics began. Investments made
by the banks were going bad....Hundreds of banks eventually closed.
Once a town’s bank shut its doors, all the knowledge accumulated by
the bank ofﬁcers effectively disappeared....Credit dried up....And that’s
when the economy collapses.
However, the implications of this view conﬂict with the commencement
of vigorous economic recovery after the business cycle trough on March 1933
and the occurrence of widespread bank failures in the winter of 1933 and
the additional permanent closing of banks after the Bank Holiday in March
1933. During the Bank Holiday, which lasted from March 6 through March
13–15, the government closed all commercial banks, including the Federal228 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Reserve Banks. Before the holiday, there were 17,800 commercial banks.
Afterward, “...fewerthan 12,000 of those were licensed to open and do busi-
ness” (Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, 425). Friedman and Schwartz (1963a,
Table 16, 438) list “Losses to Depositors per $100 of DepositsAdjusted inAll
Commercial Banks.” In 1930, 1931, and 1932, the numbers are, respectively,
.6 percent, 1.0 percent, and .6 percent. For 1933, the year in which cyclical
recovery began, the number rose to 2.2 percent.
Likewise, the vigorous recovery that began after 1933:Q1 contrasts with
thelongperiodoftimerequiredbythebankingsystemtoworkthroughitsbad
debts. The following numbers show “net proﬁts as percentage of total capital
accounts” for the indicated years: −1.5 (1931), −5.0 (1932), −9.6 (1933),
and −5.2 (1934).20 Despite the protracted difﬁculties in the banking system
evidenced by these numbers, real output grew vigorously after the 1933:Q1
cyclical trough. According to Balke and Gordon (1986, Appendix B, Table
2), real GNP grew at an annualized rate of 10.7 percent from the 1933:Q1
cyclical trough to the 1937:Q2 cyclical peak. Moreover, the implications of
the credit-cycle view conﬂict with the timing of the 1937:Q2 cyclical peak.
In 1935, 1936, and 1937, as evidenced by “net proﬁts as percentage of total
capital accounts” of 5.1 percent, 10.0 percent, and 7.1 percent, respectively,
banks had returned to good health.
The revival of money growth roughly coincident with the two cyclical
troughsofMarch1933(1933:Q1)andJune1938(1938:Q2)isconsistentwith
the end of a restrictive monetary policy that pushed the real interest rate above
thenaturalinterestrate. Ineachcase,therewasa“snapback”inoutput. Inthe
four quarters ending with 1933:Q1, real GNP fell 14.1 percent, and in the four
succeedingquartersitrose13.5percent. Similarly, inthefourquartersending
with 1938:Q2, real GNP fell 10 percent, and in the four succeeding quarters,
it rose 7.4 percent. This snap-back in output after each trough supports the
hypothesis that, in the absence of monetary restriction, the economy is self-
equilibrating in that output returns to trend relatively quickly after shocks.
Moregenerally, Friedman([1964]1969, 273)foundthatthemagnitudeof
an economic contraction predicts the magnitude of the subsequent expansion.
Atthesametime,themagnitudeofoutputincreasesincyclicalexpansionsfails
toforecastthemagnitudeofsubsequentcyclicaldeclines. Thislatterfactcon-
tradicts the implication of credit-cycle explanations of the business cycle that
recessions manifest the working out of prior speculative excess. Using data
on cyclical expansions and contractions from 1879–1961, Friedman ([1964]
1969, 272) concluded that:
20 These numbers are from Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Present, Millennial Edition, vol. 3, Part C, “Economic Structure and Performance” Table Cj238-
250, “National banks—number, earnings, and expenses: 1869–1998.” Cambridge University Press,
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[T]here appears to be no systematic connection between the size of an
expansion and of the succeeding contraction....This phenomenon...[casts]
grave doubts on those theories that see as the source of a deep depression
the excesses of the prior expansion.”
Morley (2009, 3) reconﬁrmed Friedman’s results using quarterly data from
1947:Q2–2008:Q4: “[E]xpansions imply little or no serial correlation for
output growth in the immediate future, while recessions imply negative serial
correlation in the near term.”
Because of the depth of the ﬁrst cyclical decline and because the second
cyclical decline followed fairly closely on the ﬁrst, the unemployment rate
remained high throughout the 1930s. Because of the widespread association
of“theDepression”withhighunemployment, popularloreholdsthatonlythe
deﬁcit spending of World War II ended the Depression. In fact, the ending
of contractionary monetary policy ended both the cyclical downturns. In the
Depression, both the view that monetary policy works through ﬁnancial in-
termediation and the existence of low money-market interest rates combined
to foster the assumption that monetary policy is impotent in Depression con-
ditions that push the zero nominal short-term interest rate to zero. In reply,
Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 300) wrote, “The contraction [Depression] is
in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces.”
At the time of the Depression, however, policymakers believed that dys-
functionincreditmarketspropagatedaninitialshockintheformofacollapse
inequityandlandpricesin1929. Thatdysfunctionarosefromtheinsolvencies
associated with defaults on the excessive issue of debt in the prior speculative
boom. As a result, policy focused on the disruption to credit ﬂows rather than
the money stock. The Hoover administration created the RFC to recapitalize
banks. Bordo (2008, 16) cites Richard Sylla’s ﬁgure that the RFC’s recapital-
ization of 6,000 banks amounted to $200 billion in today’s dollars. In 1932,
Congress created the Federal Home Loan Bank System to encourage housing
ﬁnance. The Roosevelt administration created numerous additional govern-
ment entities to revive credit intermediation, for example, Fannie Mae, the
Federal HousingAdministration, and the Federal Credit Union system. Many
states adopted laws preventing foreclosure of homes and farms.
Relevant to current experience is the rapidity with which the economy
recovered in the Depression when monetary contraction did not produce a
real short-term interest rate in excess of the natural interest rate. The general
lesson is the need for a monetary rule that allows the price system to function
through the absence of monetary shocks, not the need for the central bank to
supersede either the working of the price system or the allocation of credit.230 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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